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What Drives Memory-Driven Attentional Capture?
The Effects of Memory Type, Display Type, and Search Type
Christian N. L. Olivers
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
An important question is whether visual attention (the ability to select relevant visual information) and visual
working memory (the ability to retain relevant visual information) share the same content representations.
Some past research has indicated that they do: Singleton distractors interfered more strongly with a visual
search task when they were identical or related to the object held in memory. However, other research has
failed to find such effects despite using very similar procedures. The present study, using the same combined
working memory and attentional capture paradigm, demonstrates which factors do (varied mapping, low
stimulus energy) and which factors do not (exact type of visual memory method used, difficult nature of
search, heterogeneity of displays, and instruction) contribute to this discrepancy.
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For a long time, psychologists have been interested in how what
is currently on our minds affects what we currently look at (Desi-
mone & Duncan, 1995; Farah, 1985; Pashler & Shiu, 1999;
Pillsbury, 1908; Sreenivasan, Katz, & Jha, 2007). Recent research
on the interactions between visual working memory and visual
attention fits in this tradition (e.g., Awh & Jonides, 2001; Down-
ing, 2000; Oh & Kim, 2004; Olivers, Meijer, & Theeuwes, 2006;
Soto & Humphreys, 2006). The underlying idea is that visual
attention and visual working memory share important processes as
well as content representations. After all, functionally, working
memory and attention appear very similar, in that both psycholog-
ical constructs postulate the activation and prioritization of infor-
mation relevant to the task at hand over information that is cur-
rently irrelevant. Moreover, neurophysiological and brain imaging
studies have shown a striking overlap in brain areas active during
attention and working memory tasks (Cabeza & Nyberg, 1997,
2000; Corbetta & Shulman, 2001; D’Esposito, 2001; Fuster, 1997;
Handy, Hopfinger, & Mangun, 2001; Kanwisher & Wojciulik,
2000; Kastner & Ungerleider, 2000). This has led to the hypothesis
that visual attention and visual working memory are virtually one
and the same—the latter being regarded as attention directed to
visual representations in the absence of the actual visual stimulus
itself (see Awh, Vogel, & Oh, 2006; and Olivers, 2008, for recent
reviews). A clear prediction from this is that when a stimulus is
held in visual working memory, and the same stimulus then
appears in reality, it should receive priority over other objects in
the field, because its visual representations have already been
pre-activated. In other words, a memorized object should capture
attention.
Note that this prediction is less trivial than it may seem. Indeed,
we know from studies on contingent attentional capture that when
observers are looking for something specific, objects matching the
target object will involuntarily capture attention (Folk, Leber, &
Egeth, 2002; Folk, Remington, & Johnston, 1992; see Moores,
Laiti, & Chelazzi, 2003, for evidence that contingent capture may
even occur at a semantic level). Apparently, observers adopt an
attentional set for relevant information but cannot fully avoid
selection of similar, but irrelevant information. Moreover, it is
more than likely that such an attentional set involves a good deal
of working memory, especially when a task is new. After all, one
needs to remember what one is looking for. However, the question
discussed here is not one of attentional set. The question is not
whether involuntary attentional capture occurs on the basis of a
representation of something that one is currently looking for. The
question is whether involuntary attentional capture occurs on the
basis of a representation of something that one is currently not
looking for but still trying to visually hold on to for later use. Note
further that by “involuntary” I mean an automatic but not a pure
bottom-up attentional mechanism. After all, the capture is assumed
to be contingent on the content of working memory and thus
dependent on top-down context. In other words, capture here is
memory driven and not stimulus driven.
Evidence From Visual Search
Evidence for the memory-driven attentional capture hypothesis
comes from a number of visual search studies, including one by
Olivers, Meijer, and Theeuwes (2006). I will describe this study
first in some detail, as this will help in clarifying later arguments.
Figure 1A shows the main procedure. Observers were asked to
remember a particular color (red, green, blue, or yellow). At the
end of the trial, their memory was tested by asking them to choose
the original color from a set of three alternatives. There were two
versions of the memory task. In what was assumed to be the more
verbal version, the memory test consisted of easily distinguishable
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alternatives for which verbal labels were readily available, for
example “red” or “green.” In this task it is sufficient to store the
verbal label without having to put much effort in trying to create
a visual memory of the exact shade of red. In contrast, in the more
visual version, the to-be-remembered color had to be distinguished
from highly similar colors from the same category. For example, a
particular shade of red had to be distinguished from other shades
of red. It was assumed that observers would use their visual
working memory—probably not exclusively so, but more so in this
condition than in the more verbal condition.
Figure 1. Display types. A: Olivers, Meijer, and Theeuwes (2006). From “Interactions Between Visual
Working Memory and Visual Attention,” by C N. L. Olivers, F. Meijer, and J. Theeuwes, 2006, Journal of
Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 32, p. 1245. Copyright 2006 by the American
Psychological Association. B: Soto, Heinke, Humphreys, and Blanco (2005). From “Early, Involuntary Top-
Down Guidance of Attention From Working Memory,” by D. Soto, D. Heinke, G. W. Humphreys, and M. J.
Blanco, 2005, Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 31, p. 250. Copyright
2005 by the American Psychological Association. C: Downing and Dodds (2004). From “Competition in Visual
Working Memory for Control of Search,” by P. E. Downing and C. M. Dodds, 2004, Visual Cognition, 11, p.
689. Used with permission of Taylor & Francis Ltd. (http://www.informaworld.com). D: Houtkamp and
Roelfsema (2006). From “The Effect of Items in Working Memory on the Deployment of Attention and the Eyes
During Visual Search,” by R. Houtkamp and P. R. Roelfsema, 2006, Journal of Experimental Psychology:
Human Perception and Performance, 32, p. 425. Copyright 2006 by the American Psychological Association.
E: Woodman and Luck (2007). From “Do the Contents of Visual Working Memory Automatically Influence
Attentional Selection During Visual Search?,” by G. F. Woodman and S. J. Luck, 2007, Journal of Experimental
Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 33, p. 365. Copyright 2007 by the American Psychological
Association. Note that studies C, D, and E also used articulatory suppression (Artic. suppr.) tasks in various
conditions.
1276 OLIVERS
Then, a few seconds after the to-be-remembered item had dis-
appeared, the task changed to a visual search task. The target was
always a gray diamond among gray disk-shaped distractors. Par-
ticipants responded to the identity of the letter presented inside the
diamond. On many trials, however, one of the distractors carried a
unique color. Previous studies have shown that such salient dis-
tractors capture attention, as indicated by elevated response times
(RTs) relative to conditions in which no such distractor is present
(Theeuwes, 1991, 1992). The important finding here was that the
interference was stronger for distractors that matched the content
of memory than for unrelated color distractors. The other impor-
tant finding was that this was the case only for the more visual
memory condition. In the more verbal condition, there was no
effect of the relationship between the visual distractor and the
contents of memory. Note that participants had no reason to attend
to the distractor: It only interfered with the goal of responding to
the gray diamond. Thus, these results are consistent with the idea
that visual working memory and visual attention share the same
content. Moreover, follow-up experiments excluded a number of
alternative explanations in terms of implicit perceptual priming,
perceptual encoding, strategic memory updating, and delayed at-
tentional disengagement.
Around the same time, Soto and colleagues published a series of
similar experiments with very similar results (Soto, Heinke, Hum-
phreys, & Blanco, 2005; Soto, Humphreys, & Heinke, 2006a,
2006b). Their task is illustrated in Figure 1B. Participants were
asked to remember both the shape and the color of an object (e.g.,
a blue triangle) until the end of the trial (when either of these
properties could be tested). After the to-be-remembered object, a
visual search display appeared in which the target was a tilted bar
among vertical bars. Each bar appeared inside a colored shape, one
of which could match the remembered object (in color, shape, or
both). Soto and colleagues found search to be faster when the
matching object surrounded the target bar and slower when it
surrounded one of the distractor bars. As the matching object was
not predictive of the target, Soto and colleagues concluded that the
contents of working memory automatically guide attention.
Counterevidence From Visual Search
It is interesting that a couple of years earlier, Downing and
Dodds (2004) had failed to find any interactions between working
memory content and visual search using, again, very similar pro-
cedures. An example of their displays is shown in Figure 1C. On
each trial, they presented observers with two meaningless shapes.
One shape had to be remembered for the memory test concluding
each trial (the memory object), and the other shape was the target
for the subsequent search task. As in the studies described above,
the memory object could return as a distractor in the visual search
task. However, this time there was no effect (despite an admirable
number of attempts): Search RTs were not affected by the presence
or absence of a memory-matching distractor. Downing and Dodds
concluded that attentional and mnemonic representations can be
separated and/or differentially prioritized.
The Downing and Dodds (2004) study is not the only one that
reached that conclusion. Houtkamp and Roelfsema (2006) also
failed to find a clear effect of memory-matching distractors on
visual search. Their procedure is outlined in Figure 1D. Observers
were instructed to conduct two visual search tasks in a row, using
two consecutive displays of everyday objects. The two search
targets changed from trial to trial and were presented prior to the
search displays. Thus, while the participant searched for one target
in the first display, the target for the second display presumably
had to be kept in working memory. The crucial manipulation was
that the second target could be presented as a distractor in the first
display. However, this did not lead to increased search RTs when
the first target was also present (it did slightly when the first target
was absent).
Again using very similar procedures, Woodman and Luck
(2007) too failed to find evidence for memory-driven attentional
capture. On the contrary, they even found evidence for faster
search when distractors matched the content of visual working
memory (a similar effect actually also occurred in some conditions
of Downing and Dodds, 2004). An example from Woodman and
Luck’s procedure is shown in Figure 1E. Participants were asked
to remember a colored outline box with a gap on one of its sides,
after which they searched for another box with a gap at the top or
bottom. The memorized item could return as a distractor. When it
did, there was no increase in search RTs, and in some conditions
Woodman and Luck even found a significant decrease. They
concluded that the memory content does not lead to automatic
attentional capture and can even be flexibly utilized to inhibit and
avoid matching distractors.
The Present Study
We are left with contradicting results. There are studies pointing
toward automatic memory-driven attentional capture in visual
search (Olivers et al., 2006; Soto et al., 2005, 2006b), whereas
other studies, using comparable procedures, have failed to find
such capture effects or even report memory-driven inhibition
(Downing & Dodds, 2004; Houtkamp & Roelfsema, 2006; Wood-
man & Luck, 2007). In the present study, I explored a number of
factors that might account for this discrepancy. Even though ex-
perimental procedures were overall very similar, some relatively
subtle but crucial differences may account for the different results.
For example, the studies that failed to find a memory effect used
an additional articulatory suppression task to enforce the use of
visual working memory, whereas the studies that found an effect
did not use such a task. Experiment 1 therefore looked at the
consequences of using an articulatory suppression task. Experi-
ment 2 investigated whether differences in display heterogeneity
might play a role, whereas Experiments 3 and 4 looked at the
effects of difficult versus easy search. Experiments 3 and 4 also
looked at the effects of similarity between search target and
memory item, as well as distractor ratio. Experiment 5 tested the
hypothesis that the consistency (vs. variability) of the target tem-
plate from trial to trial plays an important role—a hypothesis first
raised by Oh and Kim (2003). Experiment 6 investigated the
influence of low-level stimulus energy on memory-based capture
effects. Finally, Experiment 7 explored whether different instruc-
tions might have an effect on whether memory-driven attentional
capture occurs or does not occur.
Experiment 1: Articulatory Suppression Versus
Difficult Distinction
Olivers et al. (2006) found memory-driven attentional cap-
ture when, at the memory test at the end of the trial, the
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to-be-memorized color was difficult to distinguish from the
other two alternatives (as they were drawn from the same color
category, e.g., all red). Memory accuracy was around 60%–65%.
No memory-driven capture effects were found when the colors
were easy to distinguish (as they were drawn from different
categories, e.g., red, yellow, and blue), and performance was up at
95%. Olivers et al. referred to the difficult and easy distinction
conditions as the more visual and more verbal conditions as it was
likely that observers had to rely more on their visual memory in the
former but could rely on their verbal memory in the latter. The use
of a more visual memory thus appears crucial for obtaining inter-
actions with visual memory.
The studies that failed to find a memory-driven effect used
different methods to induce visual rather than verbal memory, all
involving additional articulatory suppression tasks. At least two of
these studies used stimuli that were in principle easy to verbalize
(i.e., distinctive color categories and everyday objects; Houtkamp
& Roelfsema, 2006; Woodman & Luck, 2007). Given the overall
high memory performance in these studies (above 90%), it is
possible that the articulatory suppression task was not as effective
in preventing verbal labeling of the stimuli as was the difficult
distinction task used by Olivers et al. (2006). Downing and Dodds
(2004), in addition to an articulatory suppression task, used a wide
range of meaningless shapes that were presumably hard to verbal-
ize. Yet, with accuracy at 70%–80%, here too the memory task
may have been a little easier than in Olivers et al. (2006), possibly
allowing for some leakage from visual to verbal memory.
Alternatively, the presence of an additional task may hinder
memory-based effects because the participant now needs to coor-
dinate three tasks rather than two. The extra task burden may go at
the expense of the initiation or fidelity of the visual memory
representation (and thus at the expense of capture effects), espe-
cially since such representations require some effort to maintain.
This may occur without memory performance noticeably suffering
because the memory task was so easy to start with. In support of
this, Soto and Humphreys (2008) recently found reduced memory-
based interference when the memory task was accompanied by an
articulatory suppression task.
To test whether the articulatory suppression task is at all effec-
tive in inducing visual working memory, or perhaps even hinders
it, the present experiment repeated the easy distinction (more
verbal) and difficult distinction (more visual) conditions of Olivers
et al. (2006; see Figure 1A) but added an articulatory suppression
task (identical to the one used by Woodman & Luck, 2007). Thus,
in the easy distinction memory task, the only method for inducing
visual working memory was the presence of the articulatory sup-
pression task. This condition is referred to as the articulatory
suppression only condition. According to the verbal memory hy-
pothesis, the easy distinction may still allow for verbal categori-
zation, and thus we should not see a memory-driven attentional
capture effect, unless the articulatory suppression task is success-
ful. In the articulatory suppression  difficult distinction condi-
tion, the colors used in the memory test were difficult to distin-
guish. Together with the articulatory suppression task, this should
result in the use of predominantly visual working memory repre-
sentations and, thus, a memory-driven attentional capture effect—
unless the additional burden of the articulatory suppression task in
any way hinders the creation or maintenance of such representa-
tions.
Method
Participants. Twelve volunteers, aged 18 to 28 years (average
21.3 years) participated in exchange for a payment of €7 per hour.
Two participants were male, and 2 were left-handed. All reported
having normal or corrected-to-normal acuity and color vision. One
participant was replaced because he performed at chance level on
the memory task and produced an RT effect 10 times the group
average.
Stimuli, apparatus, procedure, and design. A HP Compaq
d530 CMT Pentium IV computer running E-Prime (Psychology
Software Tools, Inc., Pittsburgh, PA) generated the stimuli on an
Iiyama Vision Master Pro 454 SVGA 120 Hz screen and acquired
the necessary response data through the standard keyboard. All
stimuli were presented on a black background (0 cd/m2) at a
viewing distance of 75 cm. During the practice part, each trial
started with a 500-ms instruction—reading repeat—presented in
gray (13 cd/m2, letter height 0.2o) at the center of the display. This
instruction was followed by the 500-ms presentation of two cen-
tered gray digits, which the participant was required to repeat out
loud throughout the remainder of the trial (until the memory test),
at a rate of about four digits per second. The digits were drawn
from the set 2 to 9 and were 1.0o in height.
After a 1,000-ms blank, the instruction term remember appeared
for 500 ms. The instruction referred to what the participant should
do with the subsequently presented item, which was a colored disk
(radius 1.5o visual angle), presented for 1,000 ms at the center of
the display. It could be any of five main colors (red, green, yellow,
blue, or magenta) as was randomly determined with the constraint
that each color featured equally often in each condition. Further-
more, for each color, the specific hue and chroma could vary
randomly between any of nine different combinations chosen on
the basis of Munsell’s (1929) color system. The value (brightness)
of each color was roughly kept constant at around 13 cd/m2, except
for yellow, which was overall brighter (42 cd/m2) to make it
appear less brown. These were only approximations of Munsell’s
original colors, due to screen limitations.
Participants were informed that the memory task was separate
from the visual search task and were asked to remember the color.
The initial disk was then followed by a 1,500-ms blank period,
after which another instruction term appeared for 900 ms, reading
search (in gray, 13 cd/m2, letter height 0.2o). This was followed by
a visual search display, consisting of eight gray distractor disks
(radius 1.2o) and one gray diamond-shaped target (diagonal 3.0o,
all randomly varying between 11 cd/m2 and 15 cd/m2) placed on
the rim of an imaginary circle centered on fixation (radius 5.3o).
The search display remained visible until response. Participants
were instructed to find the diamond as quickly as possible without
making too many errors and to indicate whether there was an N or
an M inside it (0.2o in size, presented in black), by pressing N or
M on the keyboard with the left middle and index finger, respec-
tively. In case of an incorrect response, a feedback message
(Incorrect!) appeared for 100 ms. Inside the distractors a black
symbol resembling an hour glass on its side was drawn (;
matching the line segments of the N and M), to which no response
was required.
There were two singleton distractor type conditions, which were
randomly mixed within blocks: In the unrelated condition (50% of
the trials), one of the gray disks was replaced with a disk of a color
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unrelated to the memory item (e.g., green when the memory item
was red). In the related condition (50% of the trials), one of the
gray disks was replaced with a disk of a color that was related (but
never identical) to the memory item, by drawing it from the same
color category, but giving it a different hue and/or value (e.g., it
might be dark red when the memory item was orange red). Par-
ticipants were informed about the possible relatedness of the
distractor but were told that this was irrelevant to the task.
After 500 ms, the visual search display was followed by the
memory test. This consisted of a central row of three disks of
different colors, including the memorized color, in randomized
order. Below the disks were the numbers 1, 2, and 3. The partic-
ipants were instructed to indicate the memorized color by pressing
1, 2, or 3 on the numeric keypad, with the right index, middle, or
ring finger, respectively. An incorrect response was again followed
by an Incorrect! feedback message for 750 ms. There were two
types of memory task, which were blocked, and they differed only
in the type of memory test presented at the end of the trial: In the
memory test of the articulatory suppression only condition, the
participant was required to distinguish the memorized color (e.g.,
red) from two other main colors (e.g., green and blue). Because the
colors were so different, a verbal representation would in principle
suffice to do the task if it were not for the simultaneous articulatory
suppression task. In the articulatory suppression  difficult dis-
tinction condition, observers had to distinguish the memorized
color (e.g., red) from other shades of the same color (e.g., a slightly
less saturated red and a slightly more rusty red). These shades were
randomly chosen from the nine different chroma and hue combi-
nations mentioned earlier. The idea was that a verbal label would
be less useful.
All participants first practiced the articulatory suppression only
condition for 20 trials, then the articulatory suppression difficult
distinction condition for another 20 trials. After practice, four
blocks of each condition were completed in alternating order,
counterbalanced across participants (resulting in a total of eight
blocks). During the real experiment the instruction terms repeat,
remember, and search were replaced with fixation crosses ().
Each block consisted of 30 trials: 15 related singleton distractor
trials and 15 unrelated singleton distractor trials, randomly mixed.
There were breaks between blocks, in which participants were
notified of their search RTs, search accuracy, and memory accu-
racy. If memory accuracy dropped below 67%, participants re-
ceived another request to try their best on the memory task. The
experiment lasted about 45 min in total.
Results and Discussion
RTs. RTs shorter than 200 ms and longer than 3,000 ms
were excluded, resulting in a loss of 0.69% of data points.
Figure 2 shows the mean of the remaining correct RTs, as a
function of memory task (articulatory suppression only vs.
articulatory suppression  difficult distinction) and singleton
distractor type (unrelated vs. related). A within-subject analysis
of variance (ANOVA) with these same factors revealed a main
effect of memory task, F(1, 11)  6.51, MSE  3,022.72, p 
.05, p2  .372, and a main effect of singleton distractor type,
F(1, 11)  11.17, MSE  783.00, p  .01, p2  .504, with no
interaction, F  1. Averaged across memory task, 11 of the 12
participants showed a memory-related cost. RTs were overall
higher when the memory task was more difficult. Regardless of
the type of memory task, RTs were higher when singleton
distractors were related to the memory content than when they
were unrelated.
Errors. In the articulatory suppression only condition, search
errors amounted to 5.8% when singleton distractors were related
and 5.4% when singleton distractors were unrelated. In the artic-
ulatory suppression  difficult distinction task, errors were 5.2%
and 4.2%, respectively. None of these differences were significant,
all Fs  2.3, ps  .15. Memory errors were more substantial,
especially in the articulatory suppression  difficult distinction
condition. In that condition, 34.6% errors were made when dis-
tractors were related and 40.3% when distractors were unrelated.
In the articulatory suppression only condition, those percentages
were 4.6% and 7.3%, respectively. The main effect of memory
task was significant, F(1, 11)  165.14, MSE  0.007, p  .001,
p
2  .938, as was the main effect of singleton distractor type, F(1,
11)  9.05, MSE  0.002, p  .02, p2  .451. There was no
interaction, F  1. The overall better memory performance after
related distractors is somewhat unexpected, since one imagines
that a closely related color would interfere more with one’s color
memory. There is the possibility here that observers used the
distractor to successfully contrast with the memory item, but since
no such effects were found in our previous study (Olivers et al.,
2006) or in the subsequent experiments mentioned in this article,
I believe such an explanation is unlikely.
The rest of the results are clear: The precise way in which the
use of visual working memory is induced does not matter for
visual memory-driven attentional capture to occur. Singleton
distractors that were related in color to the content of working
memory caused greater interference than unrelated singleton
distractors, regardless of whether the memory task involved an
easy distinction (with performance around 95% and only an
articulatory suppression task to induce visual memory) or a
difficult distinction (with performance around 60%, plus an
articulatory suppression task). Combining these results with the
findings of Olivers et al. (2006), we can now sketch the fol-
lowing picture:
Figure 2. Response time (RT) results of Experiment 1 when singleton
distractors were unrelated or related to the memory content, under different
visual memory representations (articulatory suppression only or in combi-
nation with a difficult distinction at memory test).
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1. No memory-driven attentional capture when the memory
test is easy (i.e., easily verbalizable) and there is no
articulatory suppression task.
2. Memory-driven attentional capture when the memory test
is easy and there is an articulatory suppression task.
3. Memory-driven attentional capture when the memory test
is difficult (i.e., not easily verbalizable) and there is no
articulatory suppression task.
4. Memory-driven attentional capture when the memory test
is difficult and there is an articulatory suppression task.
Thus, either the articulatory suppression or the difficult dis-
tinction method is sufficient, and neither is necessary, to induce
visual memory-driven attentional capture. In other words, the
presence or absence of the articulatory suppression task is not
the reason why some failed to find such capture effects, nor
does the articulatory suppression task hinder the formation of a
memory representation.
Experiment 2: Homogeneous Versus
Heterogeneous Displays
The studies that failed to find memory-based attentional capture
(Downing & Dodds, 2004; Houtkamp & Roelfsema, 2006; Wood-
man & Luck, 2007) all used heterogeneous search displays con-
sisting of multiple different objects (e.g., all different colors,
shapes, and/or everyday objects). In contrast, Olivers et al. (2006)
used rather homogeneous displays in which all items were gray
disks, except for the target (which was a gray diamond) and the
singleton distractor (which was uniquely colored). Perhaps, then,
memory-based distractor effects are contingent on the distractor
being sufficiently salient in the first place, as is the case in
homogeneous surroundings. That is, only when the distractor pops
out of the display can it cause further costs when it matches the
memory content.1 To test whether display homogeneity is a crucial
factor in memory-driven attentional capture, I compared a homo-
geneous display condition, in which the singleton distractor was
indeed a color singleton among gray distractors, with a heteroge-
neous display condition, in which the crucial distractor was just
one of many differently colored disks. If a lack of a memory effect
is due to display heterogeneity, we should see the increased inter-
ference for memory-related distractors disappear in the heteroge-
neous condition.
Method
The method was the same as in Experiment 1, except for the
following changes. Twenty-four volunteers, aged 17 to 25 years
(average 19.8 years), participated in exchange for a payment of €7
per hour. Ten participants were male, and 2 were left-handed. All
reported having normal or corrected-to-normal acuity and color
vision. Two participants were replaced because they performed at
chance on either the search or the memory task. I used only the
difficult distinction visual memory task in which remembered
colors had to be distinguished from subtle variants. No articulatory
suppression task was used, and any displays related to this task
were dropped. In the search task, there were two display types. The
homogeneous display type was the same as that used in Experi-
ment 1: Participants searched for a gray diamond among gray
distractors, including one uniquely colored singleton distractor
(nine items in total). As before, the singleton distractor could be
related or unrelated in color to the memory content. In the heter-
ogeneous display type, the search items were of various colors
(red, green, yellow, blue, magenta, and gray). There was also a
uniquely colored singleton distractor. Note that this distractor had
a unique color (e.g., it was the only red item on screen), but it was
no longer a singleton (as it was not the only colored item on the
screen). Again it could be related or unrelated to the memorized
color. Of the six main colors, one was assigned to memory and one
to the singleton (if unrelated to memory). The four remaining
colors were distributed over the eight remaining search items
(including the target), such that there were two items for each
color. Display type (homogeneous vs. heterogeneous) was blocked
with order counterbalanced across participants; singleton distractor
type was randomly mixed within blocks.
Results and Discussion
RTs. RTs shorter than 200 ms and longer than 3,000 ms were
excluded, resulting in a loss of 0.77% of data points. Figure 3
shows the mean of the remaining correct RTs as a function of
display type (homogeneous vs. heterogeneous) and singleton dis-
tractor type (unrelated vs. related). A within-subject ANOVA with
these same factors revealed a trend toward a main effect of display
type, F(1, 11)  3.45, MSE  4,754.05, p  .076, p2  .130; a
main effect of singleton distractor type, F(1, 11)  9.55, MSE 
1,943.69, p .01, p2 .293; and no interaction, F 1. Averaged
across display type, 21 of the 24 participants showed a memory-
related cost. RTs were overall higher for homogeneous displays
than for heterogeneous displays. This makes sense because in the
homogeneous condition, the crucial distractor was really a salient
singleton distractor, causing interference with visual search. In the
heterogeneous condition, the crucial distractor was no longer a
salient singleton, resulting in overall faster search times. In any
case, regardless of the display type, RTs were increased by 28 ms
when singleton distractors were related to the memory content
compared with when they were unrelated.
Errors. Overall, more search errors were made in the homo-
geneous conditions than in the heterogeneous conditions, F(1,
23)  5.20, MSE  0.001, p  .05, p2  .184. No other effects
were significant, Fs  2.5, ps  .13. In the homogeneous display
condition, search error rates amounted to 6.6% when singleton
distractors were related and 4.6% when singleton distractors were
unrelated. In the heterogeneous displays these were 4.4% and
4.2%, respectively. Memory errors were more numerous. In the
homogeneous condition, 46.2% errors were made when distractors
were related and 44.2% when distractors were unrelated. In the
heterogeneous condition, percentages were 47.4% and 46.0%,
1 A priori, it seems that display heterogeneity cannot be the explanatory
factor since Soto et al. (2005) have reported memory-based effects despite
using rather heterogeneous displays involving multiple different shapes of
different colors. However, note that the search target was not actually one
of these shapes. Instead, the target was a tilted bar that could be presented
inside any one of them, whereas the distractors were all vertical bars. So at
the level of search items there was homogeneity.
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respectively. None of the differences were significant, Fs  2.4,
ps  .13.
In all then, I conclude that display heterogeneity is not the key
to why memory-based capture effects do or do not occur.
Experiment 3: Effortless Versus Effortful Search
Another difference between studies that found memory-driven
attentional capture and those that did not appears to be the diffi-
culty of the search task. Although search slope data are not
available for every experiment, studies that failed to find an effect
used search tasks that were likely to be more difficult, more
effortful, potentially more serial, and less efficient (probably also
due to the earlier described heterogeneity of the displays; Duncan
& Humphreys, 1989), whereas those that found effects used search
tasks that were in general easier, less effortful, more parallel, and
more efficient in nature. For example, whereas in Woodman and
Luck’s (2007) study the search target was a box with a gap at the
top or bottom among very similar boxes with gaps at their sides
(known to yield inefficient search; Woodman, Vogel, & Luck,
2001), in the Olivers et al. (2006) study the search target was a
diamond among disks (known to yield efficient search; Theeuwes,
1991, 1992). Recently, Soto and colleagues found memory-driven
attentional capture in both efficient and inefficient search (Soto et
al., 2005, 2006b), but since these involved different groups of
participants and slightly different procedures, it is difficult to
assess the relative contribution of search efficiency.
There are several ways in which search efficiency may affect the
influence of memory-related distractors. According to Theeuwes
(2004; see also Belopolsky, Zwaan, Theeuwes, & Kramer, 2007),
attention reduces its spatial window when in a more effortful
search mode. Such a narrow spatial window may result in many
distractors being effectively ignored, including the memory-related
distractor. In contrast, under effortless, parallel search conditions,
attention may be more distributed across the displays, encompass-
ing the crucial distractor. Alternatively, the parallel search displays
may have allowed for what has been called singleton detection
search mode, in which observers look for salient objects in gen-
eral, rather than for a specific target feature (Bacon & Egeth,
1994). In contrast, effortful search is likely to involve feature
search mode, in which observers look for a specific feature or
combination of features (see Theeuwes, 2004, for this argument),
and more effectively ignore irrelevant features. Again, these dif-
ferent search modes determine how attention is distributed, now
across features rather than space. Note that both under the spatial
window hypothesis and under the differential search mode hypoth-
esis, attentional capture is not strictly bottom-up, as it depends on
the overall state attention is in. Although important, this issue is
not central to the current research question, which is to determine
what modulates memory-driven attentional capture.
To test whether the type of search affects memory-driven atten-
tional capture, Experiment 3A compared the effects of memory-
related distractors under more and less efficient search conditions.
In the easy search condition, displays were homogeneous, and the
target was a unique diamond target among gray disk distractors
(including a color singleton). Previous research has shown numer-
ous times that these displays yield flat search slopes (e.g., Theeu-
wes, 1991, 1992). In the difficult search condition, displays were
heterogeneously colored, and the target was now a disk just like
the other disks in the displays. The only way in which the target
could be distinguished from the distractors in this condition was
through the small N or M presented inside it (whereas the distrac-
tors contained Xs). As will be shown in Experiment 4 (which used
the same displays but also varied set size), search for this task was
found to be highly inefficient, with slopes averaging 110 ms/item.
If the absence of memory-driven attentional capture is due to small
spatial windows or feature search mode, then we should see the
effect disappear in the difficult search condition. To generalize the
findings, and for reasons that will become apparent in the Results
section, Experiment 3B repeated the difficult search condition but
with a smaller set size and accompanied by an articulatory sup-
pression version of the visual memory task, rather than the difficult
distinction version used in Experiment 3A.
Method
The method was largely the same as before. In Experiment 3A,
28 volunteers, aged 18 to 26 years (average 20.6 years) partici-
pated in exchange for a payment of €7 per hour. Twelve partici-
pants were male, and 3 were left-handed. All reported having
normal or corrected-to-normal acuity and color vision. Two par-
ticipants were replaced because of exceptionally long RTs (beyond
three standard deviations from the group mean) as well as chance
performance at the memory task. Two more were replaced because
of effect sizes beyond three standard deviations from the group
mean (one revealing a 476-ms effect in one direction, the other a
411-ms effect in the other direction; leaving these participants in
did not alter the pattern of results, it only added noise). In Exper-
iment 3B, 10 volunteers participated, aged 19 to 24 years (average
21.6 years), of which 2 were male and 1 was left-handed. In
Experiment 3A, only the difficult distinction visual memory task
was used, without the articulatory suppression task. There were
two search types. The easy search type was the same as the
homogeneous conditions in Experiments 1 and 2: Participants
searched for a gray diamond among gray distractors, including one
uniquely colored singleton distractor. There were nine search items
in total. As before, the singleton distractor could be related or
unrelated in color to the memory content. The difficult search type
Figure 3. Response time (RT) results of Experiment 2 when singleton
distractors were unrelated or related to the memory content, for different
display types (homogeneous vs. heterogeneous).
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was the same as the heterogeneous display type of Experiment 2,
except that the target was now not a unique diamond, but a disk,
like any other item in the display. The only way the target could be
distinguished from the distractors was by the fact that it carried an
N or M rather than an hourglass X-shaped object inside it. In this
display the items had various colors, but as before, one of the dis-
tractors had a unique color that could be related or unrelated to the
memorized color. Search type (easy vs. difficult) was blocked with
order counterbalanced across participants; singleton distractor type
was randomly mixed within blocks. Because of the more difficult
search task, 40 instead of 20 practice trials were run. Six blocks of 20
trials were run, resulting in 30 trials per cell. In Experiment 3B, only
the articulatory suppression version of the memory task was used, and
only the difficult search task was run. Set size was now six instead of
nine. Six blocks of 20 trials resulted in 60 trials for each singleton
distractor type (related vs. unrelated).
Results and Discussion
RTs. RTs shorter than 200 ms and longer than 3,000 ms (in the
easy search condition) or longer than 6,000 ms (in the difficult
search condition) were excluded, resulting in a loss of 0.94% of
data points. Figure 4 shows the mean of the remaining correct RTs,
as a function of search type (easy vs. difficult) and singleton
distractor type (unrelated vs. related) for Experiment 3A (easy and
difficult search under a difficult distinction memory task) and
Experiment 3B (difficult search under an articulatory suppression
task). A within-subject ANOVA on the RTs of Experiment 3A
revealed a main effect of search type, F(1, 29)  559.7, MSE 
65,529.06, p  .0001, p2  .936; a main effect of singleton
distractor type, F(1, 27)  4.46, MSE  5,133.43, p  .05, p2 
.142; and no interaction, F  1. Averaged across search type, 20
of the 28 participants showed a memory-related cost. Search was
overall slower in the difficult search task (2,014 ms) than in the
easy search task (924 ms). Regardless of search type, related
singleton distractors led to slower search than unrelated singleton
distractors, by an average of around 29 ms.
However, even though the interaction was nonsignificant, the
underlying distractor effects differed in one aspect between the
difficult and easy search conditions: Whereas in the easy search
condition, the effect of singleton distractor type (related vs. unre-
lated) was highly reliable, t(27)  3.74, p  .001, in the difficult
search condition this was not the case, t(27)  1.06, p  .30, due
to considerably larger variance (on an effect of 29 ms, the standard
error was 28 ms; 10 of the 28 participants showed an effect in the
opposite direction). Any conclusion about the difficult condition
would be compromised by this variance. Experiment 3B was
therefore designed to repeat the difficult search condition but
reduce the variance by (a) reducing the set size from nine to six
items, and (b) replace the difficult distinction memory task with
the easier articulatory suppression memory task (see Experiment
1). The results are also shown in Figure 4. As expected, overall
RTs were significantly reduced relative to the difficult condition of
Experiment 3A, F(1, 36)  32.89, MSE  158,533.48, p  .001,
p
2  .477. What is more important is that the 52-ms difference
between related and unrelated distractor singleton types was now
reliable, t(9) 2.67, p .05 (with 9 of 10 participants showing an
effect in the same direction). Experiment 4 will once more repli-
cate this result for each of three different set sizes.
Errors. In the easy search condition of Experiment 3A, search
error rates amounted to 4.0% when singleton distractors were
related and 3.7% when singleton distractors were unrelated. In the
difficult search condition these were 4.8% and 4.1%, respectively.
These differences were nonsignificant, all Fs  1. In Experiment
3B, error percentages were 3.3% and 2.7% for related and unre-
lated distractors, respectively, and again there was no significant
difference, t  1. For the difficult distinction memory task of
Experiment 3A, errors measured a few tenths of percentage points
from 44% in all conditions, with no significant differences, all
Fs  1. For the easier articulatory suppression task of Experiment
3B, errors measured 10.5%, which was significantly less than in
Experiment 3A, F(1, 36) 125.63, MSE 0.013, p .001, p2 
.777, with again virtually no difference between distractor condi-
tions, t  1.
All in all then, there is little evidence that the type of search
(difficult or easy) plays an important part in whether memory-
driven attentional capture effects occur or not. These results con-
verge with those reported by Soto and colleagues, who also found
memory-driven capture in relatively difficult search (Soto et al.,
2005) as well as relatively easy search (Soto et al., 2006b).
Apparently, any presumed change in spatial window or singleton/
feature search mode does little to change the working memory–
attention interaction.
Figure 4. Response time (RT) results of Experiment (Expt) 3 when
singleton distractors were unrelated or related to the memory content, for
different search types (easy vs. difficult, with Experiment 3B employing an
overall easier search task than Experiment 3A).
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Experiment 4: Increasing the Distractor Ratio
Experiment 3 failed to get rid of memory-driven attentional
capture, despite search being effortful. Compare this to Woodman
and Luck (2007), in which search was presumably also effortful,
yet memory-related distractors either had no effect or led to RT
benefits rather than costs. The latter result was especially apparent
when Woodman and Luck increased the ratio of matching distrac-
tors to the number of items in the display: The greater the propor-
tion of matching distractors, the stronger the benefits. Woodman
and Luck concluded that observers may strategically inhibit
memory-matching distractors if they know that these will always
be irrelevant.
Perhaps then, performance is ultimately determined by two
processes: one attentional capture mechanism (resulting in costs)
and one inhibitory mechanism trying to inhibit or reject the very
same object. The relative success of these two processes may then
depend on the proportion of matching distractors, perhaps because
they operate under different time frames or have different proper-
ties. For example, whereas capture may be tied to a single item,
inhibition may spread from a rejected distractor to similar distrac-
tors in the display, eventually resulting in benefits (e.g., Hum-
phreys & Mu¨ller, 1993). To test this idea, we increased the number
of distractors that could be related to the content of memory from
one to two. Furthermore, we varied the overall set size between 3,
6, and 9. This way, the distractor ratios varied among 2:3, 2:6, and
2:9. Note that in Experiments 1, 2, and 3A, the ratio was 1:9, and
in Experiment 3B it was 1:6. If the relative proportion of distrac-
tors has any effect, we should see the memory-based effects being
reduced here relative to those experiments, especially in the low
set size conditions.
Method
The method was virtually the same as in the difficult search
condition of Experiment 3A, except that (a) set size was now
manipulated between 3, 6, and 9, and (b) there were now always
two distractors (instead of one) that could be related to the memory
content. Hence, for the set sizes 3, 6, and 9, the ratio of the number
of matching distractors to the total number of items in the display
was 2:3, 2:6, and 2:9, respectively. Sixteen volunteers participated,
aged 18 to 27 years (average 21.1 years). Seven participants were
male; 2 were left-handed. After a practice block of 30 trials,
participants completed four blocks of 60 trials each, with set sizes
and distractor type (related vs. unrelated) mixed within blocks.
This resulted in 40 trials per cell.
Results and Discussion
RTs. RTs shorter than 200 ms and longer than 6,000 ms were
excluded, resulting in a loss of 2.2% of data points. Figure 5 shows
the mean of the remaining correct RTs as a function of set size (3,
6, and 9) and distractor type (related vs. unrelated). An ANOVA
with the same factors revealed a main effect of set size, F(2, 30)
140.43, MSE  225,192.87, p  .001, p2  .903, and a main
effect of distractor type, F(1, 15)  17.98, MSE  7,842.74, p 
.001, p2  .545. RTs increased with set size, resulting in a search
slope of 110 ms/item. Regardless of set size, related distractors led
to slower search than unrelated distractors, by on average 77 ms.
This effect was significant for all set sizes, all ts  2.1, all ps 
.05. Averaged across set sizes, 13 of the 16 participants showed a
memory-related cost. There was no interaction, F  1.
Errors. Errors amounted to 7.5%, 5.0%, and 5.0% for set sizes
3, 6, and 9, respectively, in the related distractor condition. They
were 7.8%, 4.4%, and 4.1%, respectively, in the unrelated distrac-
tor condition. The main effect of set size was significant, F(2,
30)  3.72, MSE  0.002, p  .05, p2  .199, all other Fs  1.
Thus, errors decreased with set size, which goes against the RT
pattern. However, since there was no interaction with distractor
type, we will leave this error pattern for what it is. In terms of
memory performance, there were no significant differences be-
tween conditions, all Fs  2.2, all ps  .13. Accuracy was 51.7%,
47.3%, and 48.5% for set sizes 3, 6, and 9, respectively, in the
related distractor condition; it was 48.0%, 48.8%, and 43.3%,
respectively, in the unrelated condition.
Again, memory-based interference was present, despite search
being inefficient (as indicated by the steep search slope) and
despite (or perhaps even because of) there now being two related
distractors. Hence, the relatively high related distractor ratio at the
smaller set sizes did not alter the results.
Note that Experiments 3 and 4 also tested for another possible
factor that could explain the discrepant results between previous
studies. In the studies that failed to find memory-based effects, the
search target always resembled the object that had to be kept in
Figure 5. Response time (RT) results of Experiment 4 when singleton
distractors were unrelated or related to the memory content, for different
set sizes (which correlated with distractor ratio).
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mind. That is, they would share similar features or would be drawn
from the same category (e.g., both would be boxes with gaps in
Woodman & Luck, 2007; both would be meaningless shapes in
Downing & Dodds, 2004; and both were everyday objects or
colored patches in Houtkamp & Roelfsema, 2006). In contrast, in
the studies that did find effects, the search target was rather
dissimilar from the memory object (e.g., gray diamond vs. colored
disk in Olivers et al., 2006; tilted bar vs. colored outline shape in
Soto et al., 2005). Perhaps observers find it difficult to keep two
very similar things activated without the one interfering with the
other, and they decide to actively suppress or drop one item from
memory, which then leads to reduced memory-based effects. The
results of Experiments 3 and 4 argue against this scenario. In the
difficult search conditions, the search target and the memory object
were very similar (i.e., both were colored disks), yet the memory-
based effect was as present as before.
Experiment 5: Consistent Versus Varied Mapping
As was first noted by Oh and Kim (2003), one potentially
crucial difference between studies that found memory-driven at-
tentional capture and those that did not is that the majority of the
latter type of studies changed the search target from trial to trial—a
procedure that was referred to as varied mapping by Schneider and
Shiffrin (1977). This means that prior to the search display, par-
ticipants were presented not only with the memory object, but also
with the search target, both of which had to be remembered
(Downing & Dodds, 2004; Houtkamp & Roelfsema, 2006; but not
Woodman & Luck, 2007). Possibly then, the search target was
given priority over the memory object within visual short-term
memory, degrading or expelling the latter to a more passive
representation. As a consequence, the memory object would have
little effect on search.
In contrast, all studies that reported memory-driven attentional
capture used visual search tasks in which the target object re-
mained the same on every trial (Olivers et al., 2006; Soto et al.,
2005, 2006b). Such a procedure has been referred to as consistent
mapping, and, with training, is thought to develop into more
automatic target selection mechanisms. Implicit repetition priming
from trial to trial may aid such automation. Within the present type
of paradigm, consistent mapping may mean that there is little
working memory involved in maintaining the target template,
therefore freeing resources to create a strong and active represen-
tation of the to-be-memorized object. In turn, this will then lead to
stronger interference with the search task when a matching dis-
tractor is present.
To test this hypothesis, two main conditions were created. In the
consistent mapping condition, the target could be of any color but
was always defined in the same way: It was the only disk with a
notch cut out at the top or bottom (and participants had to decide
top or bottom) among distractor disks that had notches cut out from
their sides. In the varied mapping condition, the target was again
a colored disk with a notch cut out from the top or the bottom.
However, now the distractors could also have a notch at the top or
bottom, and so the only way to distinguish the target was by
providing participants with information on its color. To this end,
prior to the search display, participants were presented not only
with the to-be-memorized color, but also with the to-be-searched
for color, both of which varied randomly from trial to trial. As
before, one of the distractors in the search display could be related
to the to-be-memorized color. If the type of mapping is indeed an
important factor in memory-based attention effects, then we should
expect such effects in the consistent mapping condition but not in
the varied mapping condition.
Note that the response features changed from an N or M pre-
sented inside the target disk to a notch cut out from the top or
bottom of the disk. The reason for this had to do with the fact that
Woodman and Luck (2007) failed to find memory-driven atten-
tional capture, despite their search task’s involving consistent
mapping. Some other difference between their task and the one
used by Olivers et al. (2006) would thus have to account for the
discrepancy. One such difference was the fact that in the Olivers et
al. (2006) experiments (and also in Soto et al., 2005), the response
feature was perceptually rather separate or abstract relative to the
target object (an N or an M has little in common with the target
disk or diamond itself), whereas in Woodman and Luck’s study,
the response feature was integrated with the target object—that is,
it was part of the target shape (namely, a gap in the top or bottom
side of the box). Moreover, in Woodman and Luck’s task, the
response feature was very similar to one of the features that needed
to be remembered, as observers were required to remember not
only the color of the to-be-memorized object, but also the direction
of its notch. Thus, to equate the tasks as much as possible, the
current experiment switched to objects with integrated response
features, in both the memory and the search task. If this is indeed
the crucial difference, then the memory-based effects should dis-
appear in the consistent as well as the varied mapping conditions.
Method
Fourteen volunteers, aged 19 to 24 years (average 21.3 years)
participated in exchange for a payment of €7 per hour. Nine
participants were male, and none were left-handed. All reported
having normal or corrected-to-normal acuity and color vision.
Three participants were replaced because of chance performance
on the search and/or memory task. One participant was replaced
because the computer crashed before the end of the experiment.
The difficult distinction version of the visual memory task was
used (without articulatory suppression). The disks in the visual
search displays were always heterogeneously colored. Instead of
an M or an N as response feature, the target disk had a round notch
(about 0.35° in radius) cut out from the top or the bottom. Partic-
ipants responded to the target disk by pressing the J key (for top)
or the M key (for bottom).
There were two main conditions: In the consistent mapping
condition, the target could be of any color (except the memorized
color or the singleton distractor color), and it was always the only
item with a notch at the top or bottom. The distractor disks had
randomly assigned notches on the left or right. Hence, participants
could always search for the same type of target, and the memory
task consisted only of a single to-be-memorized colored disk with
a notch on the left or right (which also had to be remembered),
presented for 1,000 ms (followed by a 1,500-ms blank). As before,
a distractor in the search task could be related or unrelated to this
memorized color.
In contrast, in the varied mapping condition, the search target
was now always of a particular color, which randomly changed
from trial to trial. Again it had a notch at the top or bottom, but this
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was also the case for some of the distractors—thus, observers
needed to know the target color. This target color was specified in
advance, together with the standard to-be-memorized item. Both
colors were presented next to each other at the center of the screen,
for 2,000 ms in total (followed by a 1,500 ms blank). Thus, in this
condition, participants always had to remember two colors: One
for the immediately-following search task, and one for the memory
test at the end of the trial. A search distractor could again be related
or unrelated to the latter color.
Because of the additional task involved, the practice session
consisted of 40 instead of 20 trials per condition. Participants
always first practiced the fixed mapping condition, then the varied
mapping condition. They then completed four blocks of 60 trials
each, in counterbalanced order, resulting in 60 trials per cell. The
type of mapping (fixed vs. variable) was blocked, and singleton
distractor relationship (related vs. unrelated) was randomly mixed
within blocks.
Results and Discussion
RTs. RTs shorter than 200 ms and longer than 3,000 ms were
excluded, resulting in a loss of 1.2% of data points. Figure 6 shows
the mean of the remaining correct RTs as a function of type of
mapping (consistent vs. variable) and distractor type (related vs.
unrelated). An ANOVA with the same factors revealed a main effect
of mapping, F(1, 13) 8.83, MSE 26,444.67, p .02, p2 .404,
and a mapping by distractor-type interaction, F(1, 13)  10.91,
MSE  3,702.60, p  .01, p2  .456. Overall, RTs were faster in
the varied mapping condition. This makes sense, because only in
this condition do participants know beforehand which color the
target is. In the consistent mapping condition, they know only that
it is the only item with a notch at the top or bottom, but not which
color it is. Most interesting was the significant 80-ms increase in
interference for related distractors relative to unrelated distractors
in the consistent mapping condition, t(13) 4.00, p .01 (with 12
of 14 participants showing the effect), but no such increase in the
varied mapping condition: 27 ms, t  1, ns (7 of 14 showing a
reduction in memory-based interference; 6 of 14 showing strong
opposite effects).
Errors. In the consistent mapping condition, search error rates
measured 3.3% in the related distractor condition and 3.8% in the
unrelated distractor condition. In the varied mapping condition,
these rates were 7.5% and 6.3%, respectively. Only the main effect
of target mapping was significant, F(1, 13)  5.73, MSE  0.003,
p  .05, p2  .306, all other Fs  1. Memory errors in the
consistent mapping condition amounted to 34.1% when singleton
distractors had been related, and to 31.8% when they had been
unrelated. Memory errors were somewhat more numerous in the
varied mapping condition: 38.5% and 38.7%, respectively, result-
ing in a main effect of mapping, F(1, 13)  9.51, MSE  0.005,
p  .01, p2  .422, all other Fs  1.
For the first time in this series of experiments, the memory-
based attentional capture effect disappeared. When the target def-
inition varied from trial to trial (varied mapping condition), there
was no increase in interference for distractors that were related to
the to-be-memorized information. It appears then that having to
remember two things—what to remember and what to look for—
works at the expense of one of them, in this case the to-be-
memorized object. Thus, in line with Oh and Kim (2003), this
experiment identified one important factor in the occurrence of
memory-driven attentional capture in some studies (Olivers et al.,
2006; Soto et al., 2005) but not others (Downing & Dodds, 2004;
Houtkamp & Roelfsema, 2006).
The present experiment is reminiscent of another recent study
by Woodman, Luck, and Schall (2007) that, on the surface, ap-
peared to yield contrasting findings. They asked participants to
look for a black landolt-C type target among similar black distrac-
tors. As here, the target either remained constant (consistent map-
ping condition, in which case the same target was shown at the
start of each trial) or it changed from one trial to the next (varied
mapping condition, in which case the new target was shown at the
start of each trial). In addition, in the memory condition, observers
saw a grid of four to-be-remembered colors. Search performance
in the memory condition was compared with the condition when
nothing had to be remembered except the search target. Woodman,
Luck, and Schall found that the additional memory task affected
search efficiency, but only in the varied mapping condition. It
appears that the additional memory load jeopardizes the active
maintenance of the search target in working memory when trial-
to-trial changes require such maintenance. No such maintenance
may be necessary in the consistent mapping condition.
In contrast, the present experiment showed an effect of memory
on search in the consistent mapping condition and not in the varied
mapping condition. Note, however, that these studies address quite
different questions: The Woodman et al. (2007) study investigated
the effect of memory load on subsequent visual search through
quite unrelated objects (memory contained colors, whereas search
involved black Cs) and shows that actively maintaining a target
template may suffer from such additional load. The present exper-
iment, however, investigated the effect of memory content on
subsequent search. It suggests that the content of working memory
is sufficiently activated to affect subsequent search only when no
additional items (such as targets) need to be remembered. In fact,
the two studies perfectly complement each other: Additional mem-
ory load may push out the target template (as in the varied
mapping condition of Woodman et al., 2007), or the target tem-
Figure 6. Response time (RT) results of Experiment 5 when singleton
distractors were unrelated or related to the memory content, for consistent
target definitions (“always find the one with a notch at the top or bottom”)
versus target definitions that varied from trial to trial (e.g., “now find the
blue one and determine whether the notch is at the top or bottom”).
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plate may push out the memory content (as in the varied mapping
condition here). Both studies show that target templates and other
memory content are competing.
Experiment 6: Low Stimulus Energy Makes the
Effect Disappear
One other hypothesis that may at least partially explain why some
found memory-based capture while others did not may be phrased in
terms of stimulus energy. The present experiments (as well as Olivers
et al., 2006) used relatively large, fully filled shapes. In other studies,
the visual search stimuli may have been less well-defined. Woodman
and Luck (2007) used relatively small, outlined shapes made of
relatively thin lines. Similarly, Houtkamp and Roelfsema (2006), who
also failed to find memory-driven capture, used relatively complex
outline drawings of everyday objects in some of their experiments. It
is possible that memory-driven attentional capture effects are contin-
gent on sufficient differential bottom-up stimulus energy in the dis-
plays. For example, for red objects present in the outside world to start
resonating with the memory representation of a red object, there must
be sufficient energy in the redness channels to begin with. To test this
possibility, this experiment used the consistent mapping condition of
Experiment 5 (which did yield memory-based capture effects), but the
stimuli were now changed into very thinly outlined shapes by simply
removing the filling. This reduced the stimulus energy by a factor 18.
If stimulus energy is a factor in memory-driven attentional capture,
then such capture effects should be reduced here.
Method
Twenty volunteers, aged 18 to 26 years (average 21.0 years)
participated in exchange for a payment of €7 per hour. Twelve
were male, and 2 were left-handed. All reported having normal or
corrected-to-normal acuity and color vision.
The experiment was exactly the same as the consistent mapping
condition of Experiment 5, except that the circular shapes were
now not filled. They consisted of a circular outline of 1 pixel
thickness (approximately 0.03°). Since the radius of the circles was
36 pixels, the stimulus energy was reduced by a factor of 18 (i.e.,
	r2/2	r  r/2). Participants completed one practice block of 30
trials, followed by six experimental blocks of 30 trials each (re-
sulting in 90 related distractor trials, 90 unrelated distractor trials).
Results and Discussion
RTs shorter than 200 ms and longer than 3,000 ms were ex-
cluded, resulting in a loss of 2.9% of data points. Figure 7 shows
the mean of the remaining correct RTs as a function of singleton
distractor type (related vs. unrelated) for Experiment 6. For com-
parison the results of the consistent mapping condition of Exper-
iment 5 are also plotted. A two-tailed, paired-samples t test re-
vealed no effect of distractor type on RTs, t  1, p  .5. Nor were
there any significant effects on error rates in either the search
(2.5% for related, 2.0% for unrelated) or the memory tasks (30.8%
and 32.1%, respectively), ts  1.05, ps  .3. A mixed-design
ANOVA compared performance in Experiment 6 against that for
the consistent mapping condition of Experiment 5 (which used
filled rather than open shapes). There was a trend toward a main
effect of experiment, F(1, 32)  2.83, MSE  126,172.0, p 
.102, p2  .081, as overall RTs tended to be slower in the open
objects displays of Experiment 6. There was also a main effect of
singleton distractor type, F(1, 32)  9.76, MSE  2,536.25, p 
.01, p2  .234. It is important that there was an Experiment 
Distractor type interaction, F(1, 32)  11.07, MSE  2,536.25,
p  .01, p2  .257, reflecting the fact that memory-based capture
effects were present in Experiment 5 but not in Experiment 6. This
provides support for the idea that bottom-up stimulus energy must
be sufficiently high for memory processes to latch on. It provides
at least a partial explanation for why Woodman and Luck (2007),
who used outline shapes, failed to find a memory-based attentional
capture effect.
Note however, that the present results cannot explain all of
Woodman and Luck’s (2007) findings. In some of their experi-
ments they actually found a significant reduction in search RTs
when a distractor matched the memory content. No such reduction
was found here. Furthermore, it is difficult to see how a stimulus-
energy-based process might account for such a reduction. As
Woodman and Luck argued, the benefits associated with memory-
matching distractors may reflect strategic use of the memory
information. Since the observers know that the memorized item
will never be the target, they employ the strategy of actively
ignoring (i.e., inhibit) the matching item. Furthermore, Boucher
and Woodman (2005) reported that individuals differ in their
propensity to be attracted to or to avoid the matching distractor.
The present experiments do not exclude this possibility. In the
present data (Experiment 6), 11 of the 20 participants showed a
benefit for matching distractors, and the remaining 9 showed a
cost. Although this may of course just be random fluctuation
around a null effect, it may also reflect genuine strategy differ-
ences. In any case, whatever strategy observers were using, it was
not sufficient to prevent interference in most of the other experi-
ments in the present study.
Experiment 7: Different Instructions Do Not Reduce
Memory-Driven Capture
Perhaps another way of reducing the impact of a memory-
matching distractor is to alter the instructions. This might work if
Figure 7. Response time (RT) results for related and unrelated distractors
in Experiment (Expt) 6 when the display elements were thin outline shapes
(“open objects”), compared with the results of Experiment 5, in which
filled objects were used.
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memory-driven attentional capture is indeed under strategic con-
trol, as proposed by Woodman and Luck (2007). So far, the
instructions at the start of our experiments (here and in Olivers et
al., 2006) have explained the memory task as exactly that: a
memory task that should be treated as independent of the subse-
quent search task. Participants were informed that the distractor
might be related to the memory content but that this was irrelevant.
In Experiment 7, the instructions changed. The memory task was
never explained as being a memory task; instead it was presented as
a useful tool providing perfectly valid information on which item
should be avoided in the subsequent search task (since the target
would never carry the memorized color). In other words, the
memory item was presented as relevant to the search task. The
memory test at the end of the trial was then explained as a check
to see if participants would “use” the information provided. By
emphasizing the need to avoid the matching distractor, one might
expect to find reduced interference. Of course, by emphasizing the
to-be-avoided distractor, we may actually achieve the opposite
effect, namely that observers cannot help looking at it—akin to the
“attentional white bear phenomenon” reported by Tsal and Mak-
ovski (2006), who found evidence that to-be-avoided distractor
locations actually received more attention than empty locations.
To maximize the opportunity for strategic effects, the easily
verbalizable version of the memory task was now used (see Oliv-
ers et al., 2006, and the lead-up to the present Experiment 1).
Previously, this version did not result in memory-driven attentional
capture effects, in that there were no additional costs for memory-
matching distractors. The idea was then that an additional empha-
sis on avoiding the distractor may possibly further push perfor-
mance toward a benefit for matching distractors, as was found by
Woodman and Luck (2007). For the same purpose, the matching
distractor was now made identical in color to the memorized item
and not merely related. Finally, on the basis of Experiment 6, we
increased the line thickness of the shapes to ensure that the colors
of the shapes would be sufficiently distinguishable to be useful.
Method
Twelve volunteers, aged 17 to 26 years (average 20.0 years)
participated in exchange for course credits or a payment of €7 per
hour. Two were male, and 2 were left-handed. All reported having
normal or corrected-to-normal acuity and color vision. The exper-
iment was the same as Experiment 6, except for the following
changes: The line thickness of the outline shapes was now 5 pixels
(about 0.17°). The memory test at the end of the trial featured
easily distinguishable colors such as red, green, and blue, as was
used in one of the conditions of Experiment 1, but without the
articulatory suppression task. Most important, the instructions
changed from one explaining the memory task and the search task
as separate tasks to one emphasizing the usefulness of the memory
information for avoiding distractors in the search task (without
ever mentioning words like memory or remember). Translated
from Dutch, the crucial part of the instruction read as follows:
Look for the colored “C” that has a gap at the top or bottom. It can be
of any color. However, BEFORE the search task, you will see a color
that the C will certainly NOT have. You should use this information.
For example, if you see RED, then you know that the C you’re
looking for will not be RED. Thus, try to avoid that color. To check
if you really use this information, afterward we will ask you which
color was shown.
There were two conditions randomly mixed within blocks, one
involving identical distractors in the search task, the other involv-
ing unrelated distractors. After a practice block of 30 trials, six
blocks of 40 trials each followed (20 per condition), resulting in
120 trials per cell.
Results and Discussion
RTs. RTs shorter than 200 ms and longer than 3,000 ms were
excluded, resulting in a loss of 1.0% of data points. The mean
correct RT for search displays with unrelated distractors was 1,099
ms; with identical distractors it was 1,159 ms. The difference of 60
ms was significant according to a two-tailed pairwise t test, t(15)
3.49, p  .01, with 10 of 12 participants showing the effect.
Errors. Search error rates measured 1.2% in the unrelated
condition and 1.8% in the identical distractor condition, a nonsig-
nificant difference, t  1.33, p  .2. In the memory task, errors
amounted to 5.3% and 5.2%, respectively, again a nonsignificant
difference, t  1, p  .8.
It appears that explicitly instructing observers to ignore the
matching distractors did not reduce attentional capture by those
distractors. On the contrary, one could argue for the opposite: Now
a strong memory-based interference effect was found in a condi-
tion that previously yielded no such effects (see the more verbal
memory conditions of Experiments 1, 2, and 3 of Olivers et al.,
2006). It seems that the instructions caused observers to attend to
the distractor rather than ignore it, as might indeed be predicted
from Tsal and Makovski’s (2006) study. A skeptic could argue that
participants did not quite trust the instructions and actually ex-
pected the target to carry the to-be-ignored color at least occasion-
ally. If so, one might expect such trust to build up during the
course of the experiment. However, the memory-related interfer-
ence actually turned out to be largest and most reliable for the last
part of the experiment (76 ms, p  .01, vs. 66 ms and 36 ms for
the first and middle parts, respectively, ps  0.1). This goes
against an explanation based on mistrust.
General Discussion
The underlying theoretical issue at stake here is to what extent
the concepts of visual working memory and visual attention should
be regarded as representing one and the same function. Ever since
their development, these concepts have been increasingly rubbing
against each other. Attention has achieved a more and more central
role in controlling the information flow into, within, and from
working memory, as well as the maintenance of this information;
(Awh & Jonides, 2001; Baddeley, 1986). Conversely, working
memory has become an increasingly important theoretical factor in
the biasing and control of attention (e.g., Desimone & Duncan,
1995; Engle, Kane, & Tuholski, 1999; Lavie, Hirst, de Fockert, &
Viding, 2004). Parallel to this, it has been found that working
memory and attention tasks activate the same brain regions
(Cabeza & Nyberg, 1997, 2000; Corbetta & Shulman, 2001;
D’Esposito, 2001; Fuster, 1997; Handy et al., 2001; Kanwisher
& Wojciulik, 2000; Kastner & Ungerleider, 2000). The fourth
cornerstone would be the demonstration that attention and working
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memory share content, in that they cannot work on separate
representations. If so, then working memory content should auto-
matically bias selection. It is exactly with regard to this latter claim
that controversy has recently risen: A number of studies reported
evidence that working memory content affects visual selection
(and claimed at least partial unison of working memory and
perceptual content), whereas at least an equal number of studies,
using very similar paradigms, failed to find such effects (and
claimed the separation of working memory and perceptual con-
tent). The present study partially succeeded in resolving this con-
troversy by showing which factors do and which factors do not
contribute to the discrepant findings.
Experiment 1 showed that the discrepancy is not due to the
different ways of inducing the use of visual working memory
(rather than verbal working memory). It is also not due to search
display heterogeneity (Experiment 2) or search difficulty (Exper-
iments 3 and 4). A change in instructions also did little to explain
the different findings (Experiment 7). Experiment 5 identified the
first factor affecting memory-based attentional capture: The to-be-
memorized item lost its effect on visual search when observers
also had to actively remember the search target on each trial
(varied mapping vs. consistent mapping). Experiment 6 provided
evidence that the surface energy of the display items may also play
a role in the strength of the memory-based interference by showing
that very thin stimuli fail to induce memory-driven attentional
capture.
A Single Focus of Mnemonic Attention?
The finding in Experiment 5 that the object of visual working
memory interacts with visual search only when observers are not
also required to memorize a new search target on each trial
suggests that visual working memory does not actively maintain
multiple objects at the same time. One reason for this may be
limited capacity: Working memory can really maintain only one
object at a time. When the search target template remains identical
from trial to trial (and thus the burden on working memory is
minimal), there is sufficient capacity to maintain another object,
which, rather ironically, is then sufficiently activated to interfere
with search. However, the idea of a single object capacity goes
against current estimates of at least three to four items on average
(Cowan, 2001). Furthermore, a recent study by Soto and Hum-
phreys (2008) showed that having to remember two colored ob-
jects (instead of only one) did not diminish the effects that either
of these items had on a subsequent visual search task (see also
Woodman & Luck, 2007). This suggests that the number of items
in memory per se is not the crucial factor here. It is interesting
though, that a reduced influence of the memory content on the
visual search task was found when observers had to perform the
additional task of rehearsing two random numbers (to induce
articulatory suppression). This suggests that the additional task
may diminish the priority assigned to the task of remembering the
colored shapes in favor of the search target template, thus reducing
their influence on the subsequent search task.
The relative priority of tasks may also explain why in Experi-
ment 5 there was no effect of the to-be-memorized item. This
explanation emphasizes functionality rather than limitations: Since
in the paradigm at hand observers largely perform the tasks in
sequence (first memory encoding, then visual search, then memory
test), working memory may actively juggle the different represen-
tations necessary for the different tasks, such that the visual search
target is prioritized over, or shielded from, the to-be-remembered
object when the visual search task is at hand (and vice versa at the
memory test). When no visual search target needs to be remem-
bered (as it remains constant throughout the experiment), the
to-be-memorized object is the only object present in working
memory and therefore automatically gains priority. Thus, active
prioritization or separation of representations may occur only
when this is necessary for the task.
Evidence for separate functionality comes from a neuropsycho-
logical study on patients with damage to the inferior frontal cortex
(Soto et al., 2006a). Just as for normal observers (Soto et al., 2005,
2006b), search times were modulated by the match between ob-
jects in the search display and the to-be-remembered object. How-
ever, the important finding here was that in the frontal patient
group, search was much more affected by the memory content than
in the age-matched control group, suggesting the patients had more
trouble separating the working memory and search tasks. Con-
versely then, this implies that under normal functioning, working
memory and attentional representations can be kept relatively
shielded from each other. This relative flexibility of working
memory representations is further underlined by the findings of
Woodman and Luck (2007), which suggest that the contents of
working memory can be strategically used to inhibit (rather than
automatically enhance) irrelevant information in the attention task
(see also Downing & Dodds, 2004).
One may then argue that the conclusion that visual working
memory is fractionated, allowing for multiple representations to
coexist and to be selectively (de)prioritized according to task
demands, jeopardizes the idea that attention and working memory
are one and the same process, working on the same type of content.
After all, if one type of representation is prioritized to guide
search, whereas the other types of representation are either kept
active but shielded from the search template, or even deprioritized,
we might as well grant the first type a special status and call it
“attention,” while the other representations belong to the realms of
“working memory.” Although this is probably largely a question of
semantics (Houtkamp & Roelfsema, 2006), the unison between
working memory and attention may be saved if we assume that,
whatever selection or prioritization mechanisms occur within
working memory, they are the same as those that operate on real,
“outside” stimuli. Thus, just as attention may be focused on a
single object in the outside world, attention can also be focused on
a single object within our mnemonic world, in the absence of
visual stimulation. In both cases, this grants a special status to the
object (it is attended), at the expense of other objects, and the
separate functionality is then an emergent feature of the prioriti-
zation of one object over the others.
The idea of such a “focus of mnemonic attention” is not new.
Cowan (1995) proposed that working memory representations are
in fact long-term memory representations kept active by the focus
of attention. Representations outside the focus of attention are
more prone to decay and interference than items inside the focus.
Given that the capacity of working memory appears to be close to
four units (Cowan, 2001), this means that the focus of mnemonic
attention should span about four units. Note, however, that in the
present paradigm, this would still imply more than sufficient
capacity for both the search target template and the to-be-
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memorized object to be maintained—contrary to what was found.
A narrower focus appears to be required to account for the
present data. Such a narrow focus of attention within working
memory was proposed by Oberauer (2002; see also Garavan,
1998, and McElree, 2001). Consistent with Cowan (1995), Ober-
auer proposed that a limited number of long-term memory repre-
sentations are activated to make them, in principle, available for
direct access. However, of this subset, only one object at a time is
directly accessed—the current object of attention. Such a scheme
would fit with the present findings: When each trial requires a new
search target to be remembered, the attention will be focused on its
representation to try to keep it active in memory. This will be at the
expense of the to-be-memorized object, which is removed from the
focus of attention but is still available for direct access. This
explains why memory performance does not suffer too much in the
varied mapping conditions of Experiment 5. When the search
target remains the same from trial to trial (as in the consistent
mapping conditions), it is probably sufficient to degrade the target
representation to the activated, potentially accessible subset of
long-term memory, outside the focus of mnemonic attention. The
focus is then fully available for the to-be-memorized object, caus-
ing it to be directly accessible and to interfere with search.
Another way of looking at this, but keeping the nomenclature of
working memory and attention, is that working memory is there to
maintain templates, whereas attention is there to maintain goals.
We use the storage capacity of our working memory to set up the
different templates belonging to the different tasks (e.g., one
template for the search target, another template for the memory
object, yet another one for the response feature). Attention then
serves as a pointer to the template that is currently relevant and that
needs to be additionally activated over the other templates (de-
pending on which of the three aspects of the task currently needs
to be performed), thus instantiating the current goal of behavior.
This would imply that memory regains its original role as the store
while attention becomes the goalkeeper.
When Does Capture Turn Into Inhibition?
Although the present work can explain why Downing and
Dodds (2004) and Houtkamp and Roelfsema (2006) failed to find
memory-driven attentional capture, it cannot explain why Wood-
man and Luck (2007) regularly found exactly the opposite of
capture, namely memory-driven inhibition (see also the target-
present condition of Experiment 2 of Downing & Dodds, 2004;
and Experiment 1 of Olivers et al., 2006, for similar findings).
These are not stand-alone effects. Recently, Nieuwenstein, John-
son, Kanai, and Martens (2007) asked observers to detect two
letter targets in a rapid stream of digit distractors. Prior to the
stream, an array of three to-be-memorized letters was presented.
Each target letter in the stream could match one of the memorized
letters. The surprising result was that targets (whether the first or
the second) were more often missed when they matched the
memory content. Nieuwenstein et al. proposed that a particular
instantiation (or “tokenization”) of an object (Kahneman, Treis-
man, & Gibbs, 1992; Kanwisher, 1987) within a certain task may
be impaired when the same object is already bound to another task.
A recent follow-up by Koelewijn, Van der Burg, Bronkhorst, and
Theeuwes (2008) showed that this impairment occurs even when
observers are not required to memorize the object shown prior to
the stream. Merely showing an object makes that same object more
difficult to extract from a subsequent stream. Koelewijn et al.
suggested that objects that are irrelevant to the current task are
inhibited, resulting in impaired detection when the same object
happens to return as a target (comparable to the negative priming
phenomenon; Tipper, 1985).
There are several implications. First, at the most general level,
we can conclude that working memory content interacts with (the
selection of) perceptual content. The effects may be opposite in
sign (i.e., some studies find enhancement, others inhibition), but
the position that working memory and perceptual representations
are completely separated does not appear tenable. Second, there is
the distinct possibility that the inhibitory effects found by Wood-
man and Luck (2007) are not strategic but automatic, like in the
Nieuwenstein et al. (2007) and Koelewijn et al. (2008) studies.
Third, there is the distinct possibility that both inhibitory and
excitatory effects of memory on selection occur in a given task, but
that for some reason, one of the effects is stronger than, or outlives,
the other. For example, a recent study by Sreenivasan and Jha
(2007) suggested that distractors matching memory content are
behaviorally more intrusive but at the same time perceptually less
salient (as measured through the N1 ERP component). One can-
didate factor here is timing, most notably the interval between the
memory object and the search display. The present experiments (as
well as Olivers et al., 2006) used intervals in the order of several
seconds and found robust memory-based interference. Woodman
and Luck (2007) employed much shorter intervals (in the order of
500 ms) and found inhibition. The inhibitory effect potentially
occurs before the enhancing effect. On the other hand, Soto et al.
(2005) inserted only 188 ms between the memory item and the
search display and found clear enhancement effects, which goes
against timing as the important factor.
Conclusion
This study shows that the content of visual working memory has
robust and replicable effects on the deployment of visual attention.
This does not mean that studies that failed to find such effects in
the past did just that: fail. When all studies investigating the issue
are taken together, a pattern is emerging from which important
new insights on the nature of the memory representations and the
mechanisms operating on them can be derived. The present study
has pinpointed two such mechanisms as important (while exclud-
ing a series of others): (a) Task requirements determine the number
of objects to be held in memory and the relative priority of each;
and (b) sufficient energy from the stimulus input is required for
interactions between memory and attention to become measurable.
Nevertheless, detailed models are required to explain exactly when
memory content leads to attentional bias and when it leads to
inhibition.
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Call for Nominations
The Publications and Communications (P&C) Board of the American Psychological Association
has opened nominations for the editorships of Experimental and Clinical Psychopharmacology,
Journal of Abnormal Psychology, Journal of Comparative Psychology, Journal of Counseling
Psychology, Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance,
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology: Attitudes and Social Cognition, PsycCRI-
TIQUES, and Rehabilitation Psychology for the years 2012–2017. Nancy K. Mello, PhD, David
Watson, PhD, Gordon M. Burghardt, PhD, Brent S. Mallinckrodt, PhD, Glyn W. Humphreys, PhD,
Charles M. Judd, PhD, Danny Wedding, PhD, and Timothy R. Elliott, PhD, respectively, are the
incumbent editors.
Candidates should be members of APA and should be available to start receiving manuscripts in
early 2011 to prepare for issues published in 2012. Please note that the P&C Board encourages
participation by members of underrepresented groups in the publication process and would partic-
ularly welcome such nominees. Self-nominations are also encouraged.
Search chairs have been appointed as follows:
● Experimental and Clinical Psychopharmacology, William Howell, PhD
● Journal of Abnormal Psychology, Norman Abeles, PhD
● Journal of Comparative Psychology, John Disterhoft, PhD
● Journal of Counseling Psychology, Neil Schmitt, PhD
● Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance,
Leah Light, PhD
● Journal of Personality and Social Psychology: Attitudes and Social Cognition,
Jennifer Crocker, PhD
● PsycCRITIQUES, Valerie Reyna, PhD
● Rehabilitation Psychology, Bob Frank, PhD
Candidates should be nominated by accessing APA’s EditorQuest site on the Web. Using your
Web browser, go to http://editorquest.apa.org. On the Home menu on the left, find “Guests.” Next,
click on the link “Submit a Nomination,” enter your nominee’s information, and click “Submit.”
Prepared statements of one page or less in support of a nominee can also be submitted by e-mail
to Emnet Tesfaye, P&C Board Search Liaison, at emnet@apa.org.
Deadline for accepting nominations is January 10, 2010, when reviews will begin.
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